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Candidate Kennedy and Quemoy 
Running for president in 1960, John F. Kennedy vowed to explore a “New Frontier” — a 
hybrid of challenges and opportunities that promised progress both domestically and abroad.1  In 
essence, Kennedy envisioned a New America not chained down by the traditions of the 
Republican administration before him.  In many regards, Kennedy achieved what he desired: a 
fresh, open-minded way of approaching international issues.  Though Kennedy struggled to 
develop a new diplomatic approach to China, he did show a willingness to compromise with the 
Chinese in regards to the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.  Kennedy remained a “cold war 
warrior” throughout his presidency, but he did begin to cautiously portray himself to the 
communist Chinese as open to negotiation and more forward-thinking than the Eisenhower 
administration.  This is best reflected in Kennedy’s stance on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu 
during the 1960 presidential debate. 
The crisis between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was one of the great political tinderboxes for American foreign policy in the 1950s and 
1960s.  In 1949, during the Truman Administration, Mao Zedong conquered the mainland from 
the nationalist Republic of China.  The nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi was driven back 
and eventually found refuge on the heavily fortified island of Formosa.  At the last minute, 
however, Jiang’s forces managed to hold the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Battle 
of Guningtou (October 1949).  Both islands sit so close to the mainland they could be easily seen 
by the naked eye. The standoff between the ROC and the PRC in the Taiwan Strait remained 
frozen over a decade: the communists controlled the entire mainland and the nationalists 
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controlled Taiwan, along with the nearby islands of Quemoy and Matsu.  On several occasions, 
though, tensions between the PRC and ROC flared up, and it took U.S. intervention to prevent 
the renewal of the Chinese Civil War. 
In 1954-1955, the United States found itself being dragged into the first of multiple Strait 
Crises.  It began when President Eisenhower removed the Seventh Fleet blockade in the Formosa 
Strait on February 1953.  This resulted from American domestic pressure to support Jiang in a 
possible clash with the PRC even though the ROC had no chance of victory.  To the PRC, it 
appeared the nationalists and Americans were preparing for an invasion of the mainland when 
they began stationing thousands of troops on Kinmen and Matsu.2  The communists responded 
with heavy artillery directed at Kinmen and Matsu.  Some Americans called for nuclear weapons 
to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan.  President Eisenhower was reluctant to respond with 
nuclear weapons; instead the Americans passed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 
(1954), which declared that if Taiwan was attacked by the PRC, the United States would 
intervene.3  However, this treaty did not apply to all the islands that Taiwan controlled and 
claimed to be vital to their national security. 
The ROC had been an American ally since WWII, and most Americans viewed it as 
unacceptable to abandon it to the communists on the Mainland.  For this reason, America 
committed itself to defending the nationalists from a communist takeover.  For the PRC, Taiwan 
was a vital province of China that was openly in rebellion.  Thus the PRC viewed Taiwan as an 
internal issue; threats of U.S. involvement challenged PRC sovereignty.  The PRC demanded 
America abandon all commitments to Taiwan before it would open up formal relations.  The 
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United States refused to do this, chaffing at the notion of allowing any more territory to fall to 
communism.  For this reason, Sino-American relations would not drastically improve until the 
1970s. 
Kennedy’s Anti-Communism Credentials 
Though Taiwan looked at the Democratic John F. Kennedy with apprehension, ROC 
leaders could take comfort that he was a staunch anti-communist.  Kennedy expressed his anti-
communist sentiment particularly strongly in political debates and speeches — although 
sometimes in private, Kennedy signaled openness to improving relations with the PRC if it 
halted the anti-American rhetoric, accepted the American commitment to Taiwan, and was less 
aggressive in Southeast Asia.  
In 1947 while serving in the House of Representatives, Kennedy called for the indictment 
on charges of perjury for Harold Christoffel, a United Auto Workers union member who called 
for a strike in 1941 against the Allis-Chalmers Company.4  Kennedy suspected Christoffel of 
being a communist, and the Allis-Chalmers Company was vital to the national defense effort.  
Wisconsin Congressman Charles J. Kersten called Kennedy’s early bold action against 
communism one of “[T]he first shots fired against American communism in this country.”5 To 
Christoffel, Kennedy opened the door for McCarthyism. Then in 1948, Kennedy broke from the 
Democratic Party and voted for the Mundt-Nixon Bill, which required domestic communists and 
their members to register with the federal government. 
In 1949, Representative Kennedy even accused fellow party-member President Harry S. 
Truman and his administration of being soft on communism and blamed the loss of mainland 
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China exclusively on the White House and State Department — a position normally associated 
with Republicans.6  Probably the most interesting display of Kennedy’s anti-communist 
background was in his friendship with Joseph McCarthy.  McCarthy was the face and heart of 
the Red Scare of the 1950s and was a family friend of the Kennedys dating back to a friendship 
with Joseph Kennedy Sr., the controversial father of the senator.  This family friendship is no 
more apparent than in the fact that Bobby Kennedy got his first start in politics working for 
McCarthy.7   
During a House session on May 9th, 1951, Rep. Kennedy criticized Great Britain and 
other countries for providing the PRC with rubber and other war materials.  At this point, 
American troops were fighting and dying against the Chinese troops in Korea.  Kennedy wanted 
the legislature to disrupt the PRC’s ability to wage war. “The Congress of the United States must 
in conscious take action that will condemn and forbid any further shipment of materials, useful in 
war, to Communist China directly, or indirectly through Hong Kong,” declared the young 
congressman.8 
In 1952 when running for the Massachusetts Senate Seat against incumbent Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Kennedy brazenly accused his opponent of being the number one supporter of the 
Truman foreign policy that appeased the communists.  Kennedy also accused Lodge as failing as 
a senator because he refused to support legislations that would have halted the trading of war 
materials to the communist nations.9  Kennedy’s campaign secretary William Sutton went as far 
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as to call Kennedy “ultraconservative” and said that many of his speeches when running for 
Congress in 1946 stressed anticommunism.10 
Kennedy Displays Some Flexibility 
Though Kennedy was constantly reasserting himself as a leading anti-communist, he 
believed that relations with communist China could slowly be improved without hurting the 
American relationship with Taiwan.  He took a pragmatic approach to gradual rapprochement.  A 
message that Kennedy promulgated, which actually echoed the communist line, was his extreme 
anti-colonialism, especially against continued colonialism in French Indo-China. In Kennedy’s 
own words in his book The Strategy of Peace, “to pour money, materi[a]l, and men into the 
jungles of Indo-China without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerous, futile, 
and self-destructive.”11   
Kennedy also preached the importance of India and the PRC to the development of the 
world, and how they would be models of development in Asia, calling them “poles of power.”12   
Unlike many officials, Kennedy doubted any possibility of ROC President Jiang Jieshi regaining 
the mainland and accepted the fact that America would have to learn to live alongside the 
People’s Republic of China.13  As much as America would have liked for the nationalist Chinese 
to regain the Mainland, it would be futile and dangerous to encourage Jiang to engage in 
aggressive behavior.   
In 1957, a few years before he ran for the presidency, Kennedy admitted in an article that 
“United States policy was ‘probably too rigid’ and ran the risk of missing opportunities to 
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improve relations with China.”14  On June 14th, 1960, Kennedy suggested in a speech that the 
next administration should try to bring the PRC more into the global community.  Kennedy 
asserted that the PRC in particular could be involved in the Geneva negotiations and an effort to 
limit nuclear bomb testing — one of the most important global issues of the times.  Kennedy told 
the American people, 
[In discussing how to open up Sino-American dialogue] Perhaps a way could be found to 
bring the Chinese into the nuclear ban talks at Geneva — so that the Soviets could not 
continue their atomic tests on the mainland of China without inspection — and because 
Chinese possession of atomic weapons could drastically alter the balance of power.15 
Kennedy went even further than just including the Chinese in the Geneva accords. “If 
that contact proves fruitful, further cultural and economic contact should be tried,” he asserted.16  
In 1960 at least, Kennedy envisioned a China that would back off from the anti-American 
rhetoric and informal relations could begin to develop in the country.  He was aware that the 
relations would not happen overnight and would be miniscule at first.  In essence, Kennedy knew 
opening the front door for China would be impossible — but cracking a window might be 
achievable.  If a window was cracked between the two countries, it could be slowly opened until 
real diplomatic relations became feasible. 
Factors that Hindered Rapprochement with China 
One of the President Kennedy’s biggest obstacles when it came to improving relations 
with China was his political party.  Kennedy, though an extreme Cold War Warrior, was still a 
Democrat.  It was under Democratic President Harry S. Truman in 1949 that the Communist 
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Chinese defeated the Nationalist forces of Jiang Jieshi and claimed the mainland.  Though 
Truman protected Jiang’s regime and helped fortify it on Formosa, the Republican Party still 
relentlessly attacked the Democrats for being “soft on Communism.”17  For this reason, 
presidential candidate Kennedy would have to be very careful in re-evaluating Chinese foreign 
policy; if he strayed too far from the status quo, he could easily catch Republican censure for 
being another “Pink Democrat.”18  The worst thing that could happen to the Democratic Party 
and President Kennedy, they believed, would be to lose another Southeast Asian country to 
communism.  This would be the atmosphere of political turmoil in which Democratic Kennedy 
would run for the presidency. 
Election of 1960 and the Presidential Debates 
Though Kennedy made his anti-communism credentials clear long before claiming the 
presidency, he also showed he would be open to bringing China into the international community 
if they would abide by American standards.  Kennedy himself advocated for an “Open Door” 
where the U.S. would be willing to negotiate with the PRC if it showed it was open to such an 
approach.  Senator Kennedy, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1957, said, “We should indicate our 
willingness to talk to them when they so desire to do so and to set forth conditions of recognition 
which seem responsible to the watching world.”19  
Later, in 1960, Chester Bowles, Kennedy’s campaign advisor and future under-secretary 
of State, echoed this earlier flexibility, asserting that “Sen. John F. Kennedy has time and again 
warned of the dangers of the inadequate, insensitive and inept policies with which we have 
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attempted to deal with the vital questions of foreign policy.”20 Bowles continued that Kennedy 
realized that international dilemmas could not always be solved by having the biggest bombs.  
Instead, the key was to find agreements with the Soviets and Chinese, whether it was through 
nuclear testing controls, arms limitation, or space exploration.21  Bowles cited Kennedy as 
concluding, “The problem is to find a beginning.”22   
By the fall of 1960, Kennedy and Republican Richard Nixon were in the midst of the 
heated presidential debates.  This was the first time a presidential debate was nationally televised 
and much of the American population tuned in.  On October 7, 1960, Kennedy and Nixon 
engaged in the second presidential debate in Washington, D.C.  Near the end of the debate, the 
topic turned to Quemoy. Kennedy took a pragmatic approach and posited the islands as 
“indefensible” and not of vital interest.  If the PRC seized the islands, the United States should 
not go to war over it.  In Kennedy’s own words: “These islands are a few miles — five or six 
miles — off the coast of Red China, within a general harbor area and more than a hundred miles 
from Formosa. We have never said flatly that we will defend Quemoy and Matsu if it’s attacked. 
We say we will defend it if it’s part of a general attack on Formosa.”23  Sensing an opening, 
Nixon immediately attacked Kennedy, declaring the islands lay in the zone of freedom.  More 
importantly, the communists do not want these islands, but rather coveted Taiwan itself, claimed 
the vice president.  The PRC would not be satisfied until it conquered Taiwan.  Nixon further 
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asserted that the Democratic nominee viewed the islands as little more than “indefensible rocks,” 
instead of the highly fortified protective islands that they actually were.24   
Nixon declared that if Kennedy was elected, the PRC would invade Quemoy and Matsu, 
knowing the United States would not respond.25  Land that had been secured by the nationalists 
for ten years, Nixon asserted, would fall to communism due to an unexperienced Kennedy 
dealing with the aggressive communist threat.  If China was able to conquer Quemoy and Matsu 
without a struggle, then they would naturally invade Taiwan and drag the United States into 
another war.  In the words of Nixon, “The last Democratic administration left the nation with one 
of the bloodiest and costliest wars in its history, and another Democratic regime would plunge it 
into another.”26   
As a matter of principle, Quemoy and Matsu could not be lost to the communists, insisted 
Nixon.  Republican Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA) later joined the attack, blasting Kennedy’s 
declaration as “fuzzy” on the issue and condescendingly adding that Kennedy “would be better 
qualified to speak on relations between the United States and Communist China after he had a 
little more maturity and experience.”27   
Jiang Jieshi also angrily renounced Kennedy’s assertion on the nationalist islands.  The 
ROC’s foreign office said that Nationalist China had not required any American soldiers to 
defend these islands over the past ten years, and it refused to surrender any more land to the 
communists.28  The islands were of strategic importance to Taiwan because they offered 
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positions that keep the PRC from staging further attacks into Taiwan, explained Jiang.  
According to Admiral Liu Yuzhang of the Nationalist Navy, “The Communists cannot fully use 
the nearby ports of Amoy and Foochow for invading Formosa as long as Quemoy and Matsu are 
under Nationalist control.”29  If Kennedy allowed these islands to be abandoned, Liu asserted, 
the American president would open an alley for the invasion of Taiwan.  The Republicans and 
the China Lobby refused to allow this to happen.   
Despite the onslaught, Kennedy stuck by his guns and refused to apologize or change 
policy.  The Democratic nominee accused Nixon of wanting war and willing to fight the Chinese 
over a small matter.  At a Democratic party dinner speech on October 12, 1960, a day before the 
third presidential debate, Kennedy explained, “I will not risk American lives and a nuclear war 
by permitting any other nation to drag us into the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong 
time through an unwise commitment that is unsound militarily, unnecessary to our security, and 
unsupported by our allies.”30  By taking a public stand of pragmatism on the islands, Kennedy is 
trying to channel some flexibility to the PRC. 
On October 13, 1960, Kennedy and Nixon engaged in the third debate.  This debate broke 
new technological ground because it occurred on a split screen with Nixon in Los Angeles and 
Kennedy in New York.  Due to identical sets, it appeared the politicians were debating in the 
same room when in reality they were across the country from each other.  But if the technology 
was new, the main topic remained Quemoy and a large portion of the debate was a continuation 
from the second debate.  When asked if he would defend the islands of Quemoy from Chinese 
attack, Nixon talked around the question.  The Chinese, he explained, would not be attacking the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ibid.	  
30	  Peter	  Kihss,	  “Kennedy	  Charges	  Nixon	  Risks	  War:	  Opponent	  ‘Trigger-­‐Happy’	  on	  Quemoy,”	  New	  York	  Times,	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islands solely for the islands but as an effort to conquer Formosa.  Since this would be the case, 
Nixon said, “In the event that their attack then were a prelude to an attack on Formosa, there isn't 
any question but that the United States would then again, as in the case of Berlin, honor our 
treaty obligations and stand by our ally of Formosa.”31 
Kennedy also stuck by his earlier statement during the debate, saying, “Now, that is the 
issue. I believe we must meet our commitment to uh — Formosa. I support it and the Pescadores 
Island. That is the present American position. The treaty does not include these two islands.”32  
Kennedy also talks about how Quemoy, only a few miles from the mainland, was not within the 
border of the treaty area.  Kennedy also cited Admiral Yarnell, commander of the Asiatic fleet, 
as saying, “These islands [Quemoy and nearby islands] are not worth the bones of a single 
American.”33  Kennedy was clearly sending the message that he was not going to back down on 
his stance regarding Quemoy from Republican pressure. 
Winning the Presidency: Realizing Rapprochement Must Wait 
Less than a year into his presidency, sailing off the coast of Massachusetts, the intense 
campaign behind him, we find a very different Kennedy.  At the mere mention of foreign policy 
talk about China, the president was to have said, “Jackie, we need the Bloody Marys now.”34  At 
this point in his presidency, Kennedy realized that the New Frontier would not as easily be 
applied to China as it was to other global issues.  It became clear that China was unwilling to 
budge on the topic of Taiwan and its continued aggression toward India remained a serious 
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  Commission	  on	  
Presidential	  Debates,	  Accessed	  May	  2,	  2015,	  www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-­‐13-­‐1960-­‐debate-­‐
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problem for America.  Americans were also gravely concerned over Chinese progress toward 
nuclear weapons since the PRC was showing more aggressive tendencies than even the Soviets.  
On August 2nd, 1961, Kennedy reaffirmed U.S. opposition to the admission of the PRC into the 
United Nations.  Even more antagonizing to the PRC, Kennedy promised to continue military 
and economic aid to Taiwan.35  
President Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election against Richard Nixon by a slim 
margin.  He beat Nixon in the electoral vote 303 to 219, but if Nixon had been able to get Illinois 
and Texas’ votes, he would have won the election.  When it came to the popular vote, Kennedy 
got 49.7% of the votes compared to Nixon’s 49.6%.36  As this election illustrated, Kennedy did 
not have a lot of wiggle room and could not do anything that would alienate a large number of 
voters.  In July 1961, Congress sent a clear message that it did not want a drastic change in 
foreign policy to China.  The Senate passed a resolution that would ban the admission of China 
into the U.N. and would continue to not formally recognize the PRC.  This resolution passed the 
Senate 76-0, and the House also passed it 395-0.37 
The Legislative Branch had sent a clear message to Kennedy that it was not interested in 
improving relations with China.  Instead, it wanted to keep the PRC out of the U.N. and out of 
formal relations with the United States.  The American people themselves spoke up through 
public surveys.  In 1959, 61% of Americans voted to keep China out of the U.N., but the 
percentage rose to 71% in 1964, largely due to their aggressive policies in India and continual 
rhetoric against America.38  
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 Like all good politicians, Kennedy tried to gauge the domestic ramifications for any 
diplomatic positions that he took abroad.39  Aware that trying to improve relations with China 
would destroy almost any hope of reelection, Kennedy accepted the need to maintain the “status 
quo” in regards to China and Taiwan.  It became clear that formal relations would not develop 
between these two countries during Kennedy’s presidency; the president instead focused on 
informal diplomacy.  This would be the foundation of Sino-American relations until 1972.  
Kennedy wanted to be flexible with Communist China while preserving his commitment to 
Taiwan.  He saw the ability to do this through developing informal relations with China.40 
President Kennedy wanted to apply the “New Frontier” to China.  He energetically 
sought a pragmatic and progressive relationship with the PRC.  However, the chains of the 1950s 
Cold War could not be broken immediately by a young and ambitious Easterner.  Kennedy tried 
to move too quickly to open relations with the Chinese and felt an immediate backlash from the 
Republican Party, the China Lobby, and Taiwan itself.  When this was combined with increased 
Chinese aggression in the early 1960s, persistent anti-American rhetoric, and a closing in on 
nuclear weapons, China was deemed too aggressive still for Kennedy to reach out to.   
However, Kennedy did lay groundwork by stressing the need to find common ground and 
move slowly.  Kennedy was right that rapprochement would begin over a common issue, or in 
his own words, “The problem is to find a beginning.”41  Interesting enough, it is Republican 
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Richard Nixon, one of Kennedy’s biggest critics for not being hard enough on the communists, 
who visited China in 1972.  This visit greatly improved Sino-American relations and led to 
official recognition in 1979. 
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